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We prove the security of Gaussian continuous-variable quantum key distribution against arbitrary
attacks in the finite-size regime. The novelty of our proof is to consider symmetries of quantum
key distribution in phase space in order to show that, to good approximation, the Hilbert space of
interest can be considered to be finite-dimensional, thereby allowing for the use of the postselection
technique introduced by Christandl, Koenig and Renner (Phys. Rev. Lett. 102, 020504 (2009)). Our
result greatly improves on previous work based on the de Finetti theorem which could not provide
security for realistic, finite-size, implementations.
Quantum key distribution (QKD), the art of gener-
ating a secret key among distant parties in an untrusted
environment, is certainly the most studied quantum cryp-
tographic primitive. Since the seminal papers of Ben-
nett and Brassard [1] and Ekert [2], considerable progress
has been made in terms of security analysis [3]. Secu-
rity against arbitrary attacks has been proven for several
protocols, even in the realistic finite-size regime. This
is quite remarkable because of the very large number
of possible attacks against which security needs to be
guaranteed. Security proofs generally circumvent this
problem by using the natural permutation invariance of
most QKD protocols which allows to restrict the analy-
sis to the much smaller class of collective attacks, where
the eavesdropper interacts independently and identically
with every communication signal. In an entanglement-
based description of QKD, this amounts to assume that
the joint state ρAnBn that the two legitimate parties, Al-
ice and Bob, hold after the initial distribution of entan-
glement, has an identical and independently distributed
(i.i.d.) structure ρAnBn = σ
⊗n
AB, where n is the number
of quantum signals exchanged during the protocol.
One usually achieves this reduction from general to
collective (i.i.d.) attacks thanks to either de Finetti-
type theorems [4] or the postselection technique [5]. Un-
fortunately, these tools cannot be directly applied to
continuous-variable (CV) protocols because they require
the dimension of the Hilbert space to be finite (and small
compared to n). However, by prepending a suitable en-
ergy test to the protocol, it is still possible to use a spe-
cific variant of the de Finetti theorem and derive the
security of CV protocols, but only for impractically large
values of n [6]. Here, we wish to improve the analysis of
[6] to prove the security of continuous-variable QKD in
the realistic finite-size scenario.
The specificity of CV protocols is that the detection
consists of (homodyne or heterodyne) measurements of
the light-field quadratures (see Ref. [7] for a review).
From an experimental point of view, they present many
advantages over discrete-variable protocols. Most impor-
tantly, they can be implemented with standard telecom
components and are compatible with Wavelength Divi-
sion Multiplexing [8], which is an important advantage
when integrating QKD into real-world telecommunica-
tion networks. Moreover, quadrature measurements do
not require any photon counters and higher repetition
rates can be achieved. Distribution of secret keys over
long distances (more than 80 km) is currently achiev-
able [9], making CV protocols competitive with respect
to their discrete-variable counterparts. Their security
analysis, however, is technically challenging due to the
infinite-dimensional nature of the relevant Hilbert space.
Among CV protocols, the so-called Gaussian ones are
the most popular ones, primarily due to their experi-
mental simplicity. In a prepare-and-measure scheme, one
party, Alice, prepares coherent or squeezed states with a
Gaussian modulation and sends them to a receiver, Bob,
who applies a homodyne or heterodyne measurement.
In the equivalent entanglement-based scheme, Alice pre-
pares an entangled two-mode squeezed vacuum state (the
continuous-variable equivalent of the Bell pair), keeping
one mode and sending the other one to Bob through the
quantum channel. Then both parties measure their re-
spective mode with either a homodyne or heterodyne de-
tection, obtaining two strings of correlated real-valued
data. Finally, Alice and Bob extract a secret key through
information reconciliation and privacy amplification.
The security of Gaussian protocols in the aymptotic
regime is rather well understood: de Finetti’s theorem
guarantees that collective attacks are optimal [6] and
Gaussian attacks are known to be optimal among col-
lective ones [10, 11]. On the other hand, their security
in the much more relevant finite-size regime is less clear,
due to the difficulty of the reduction from general attacks
to the i.i.d. scenario. Currently, two results in this di-
rection are known for CV protocols, either based on a de
Finetti theorem as stated above or on an uncertainty re-
lation. The de Finetti approach [6] is unsuitable in prac-
tical scenarios because n, the required number of signals
exchanged during the protocol, is too large. The second
approach, using an entropic uncertainty inequality [12],
works for more reasonable values of n but unfortunately
does not converge towards the asymptotic key rate secure
against collective attacks in the limit of infinitely many
2signals. Consequently, the tolerated losses are quite low,
corresponding to a few hundred meters only.
In the remainder of this Letter, we first explain how
to modify a protocol secure against collective attacks by
the addition of an initial test in order to enforce a certain
property of the entangled state, namely a low single-mode
photon number. Then, we apply these ideas to the spe-
cific case of a Gaussian protocol where Bob performs het-
erodyne measurements and establish its security against
arbitrary attacks.
Main result.— In this paper, we give the first security
proof of CV QKD against general attacks, which guaran-
tees a secret key rate for realistic experimental regimes,
in terms of losses and noise. As in [6, 12], this is achieved
by prepending an initial test to a protocol already proven
secure against collective attacks. The purpose of the test
is to verify that the quantum state shared by Alice and
Bob is well-approximated by a state living in a reason-
ably small dimensional Hilbert space. Then, one can use
the postselection technique [5] which shows roughly that
if a (permutation-invariant) protocol is ǫ-secure against
collective attacks, then it is ǫ˜-secure against general at-
tacks with ǫ˜ = ǫ× poly(n).
Our result improves that of Ref. [6] for two reasons.
First the postselection technique guarantees much better
bounds than the approach based on a de Finetti the-
orem when reducing general to collective attacks [13].
Moreover, and this is in fact the main technical contri-
bution of the present work, we exploit specific symme-
tries of the CV QKD protocol in phase space instead of
the usual and less powerful permutation symmetry. We
therefore obtain a very tight bound on the effective di-
mension of the quantum state. More precisely, the QKD
protocol is invariant if Alice and Bob process their respec-
tive modes with global conjugate passive linear transfor-
mations of their n modes before performing their mea-
surements. This “rotational-symmetry” in phase space
is better suited to analyze CV protocols [20], allowing
to precisely bound the effective number of photons per
mode from the results of random quadrature measure-
ments. This is in stark contrast with Ref. [6] where the
test only exploited the permutation symmetry of the pro-
tocol.
QKD protocols and their security.— A QKD pro-
tocol is a CP map from the infinite-dimensional Hilbert
space (HA ⊗ HB)⊗n, corresponding to the initially dis-
tributed entanglement, to the set of pairs (SA, SB) of l-bit
strings (Alice and Bob’s final keys, respectively) and C,
a transcript of the classical communication. In order to
assess the security of a given QKD protocol E in a com-
posable framework, one compares it with an ideal proto-
col [14]. Such an ideal protocol F can be constructed (at
least in principle) by concatenating the protocol with a
map S taking (SA, SB, C) as input and outputting the
triplet (S, S, C) where the string S is a perfect secret key
(uniformly distributed and unknown to Eve) with the
same length as SA, that is F = S ◦ E . Then, a protocol
will be called ǫ-secure if the advantage in distinguishing
it from an ideal version is not larger than ǫ. This ad-
vantage is quantified by (one half of) the diamond norm
defined by
||E − F||⋄ := sup
ρABE
‖(E − F)⊗ idK(ρABE)‖1 , (1)
where the supremum is taken over (HA⊗HB)⊗(n+k)⊗K
for any auxiliary system K.
Prepending a test.— Our main technical result is
a reduction of the security against general attacks to
that against collective attacks, for which security has
already been proved in earlier work. Let us therefore
suppose that our CV QKD protocol of interest, E0, is
secure against collective attacks. We will slightly mod-
ify it by prepending an initial test T . More precisely, T
is a CP map taking a state in a slightly larger Hilbert
space, (HA ⊗ HB)⊗(n+k), measuring k randomly cho-
sen modes (identical for Alice and Bob) and comparing
the measurement outcome to a value fixed in advance.
The test succeeds if this norm is small, meaning that the
global state is compatible with a state containing only
a low number of photons per mode, that is a state well-
described in a low dimensional Hilbert space, which leads
to better bounds when using the post-selection technique.
Depending on the outcome, either the whole protocol
aborts, or one applies E0 on the n remaining modes. A
more precise description is provided as part of the “het-
erodyne protocol” below.
For our purpose, it is crucial that the test is feasible in
practice. This is the case here since it only involves k ad-
ditional homodyne (or heterodyne) measurements com-
pared to the original scheme E0, with k much smaller than
n, as well as applying some classical post processing to
Alice and Bob’s data.
In order to establish that the protocol E := E0 ◦ T is
ǫ-secure against arbitrary attacks, one needs to bound
||E − F||⋄. The postselection theorem [5] allows one to
bound the diamond norm between such maps by sim-
ply considering i.i.d. states (i.e. the equivalent of col-
lective attacks), but only when the maps act on fi-
nite dimensional spaces. We address this issue by in-
troducing another CP map P which projects a state
in (HA ⊗ HB)⊗n onto a low-dimensional Hilbert space
(HA ⊗ HB)⊗n where HA := Span(|0〉, |1〉, · · · , |dA − 1〉)
and HB := Span(|0〉, |1〉, · · · , |dB − 1〉) are respectively
a dA and a dB-dimensional subspace of the Fock spaces
HA andHB. We define (virtual) protocols E˜ := E0◦P◦T
and F˜ := S ◦ E˜ . The security of the protocol E is then a
consequence of the following derivation:
||E − F||⋄ ≤ ||E˜ − F˜||⋄ + ||E − E˜||⋄ + ||F − F˜||⋄
≤ ||E˜ − F˜||⋄ + ||E0 ◦ (id− P) ◦ T ||⋄
+||F0 ◦ (id− P) ◦ T ||⋄
≤ ||E˜ − F˜||⋄ + 2||(id− P) ◦ T ||⋄, (2)
where we used the triangle inequality and the fact that
the CP maps E0 and F0 cannot increase the diamond
3norm. The first term can be bounded thanks to the posts-
election theorem because E˜ and F˜ are finite dimensional,
and it can be made arbitrary small at the price of re-
ducing slightly the key rate. The second term can be
bounded thanks to the following theorem for which we
give a proof sketch for the “heterodyne protocol” below
(and a full proof in Appendix A).
Theorem 1. (Informal.) For any rotationally-invariant
state ρABE ∈ (HA ⊗HB)⊗(n+k) ⊗K,
|| (idH⊗n − P) ◦ T ⊗ idK(ρABE)||1 ≤ ǫ, (3)
where ǫ is a function of k, n, the dimensions dA and dB
for the projection P and the value of the threshold in the
test T .
Description for the protocol with heterodyne
detection.— Let us now consider a specific example of
a QKD protocol E0. For the sake of clarity, we choose
(arguably) the simplest one [15]. In the prepare-and-
measure version of the protocol, Alice prepares n coher-
ent states which are modulated with a Gaussian distri-
bution, and sent through the quantum channel. In the
equivalent entangled version of the protocol, for which
we prove security, Alice prepares n two-mode squeezed
vacuum states, measures one mode of each state with a
heterodyne detection and sends the other one through the
quantum channel. Bob then performs a heterodyne mea-
surement of the states he receives. This means that he
measures both quadratures q and p for each mode. This
is achieved by sending the modes on a balanced beam-
splitter and measuring the q quadrature for one output
mode and the p quadrature for the other one. At the
end of this process, Alice and Bob have access to two
correlated vectors in R2n, ~xA for Alice and ~xB for Bob.
Then, they perform the reconciliation procedure [16] in
order to extract a common string, and finally privacy
amplification [17] to distill their final secret keys, SA and
SB, respectively.
This protocol is invariant under the action of conju-
gate passive symplectic operations (beamsplitters and
phase shifts) because these correspond to some orthog-
onal transformation R ∈ O(2n) of the quadratures in
phase space. Specifically, if such an operation is applied,
then Alice and Bob’s vectors become R~xA and R
T~xB (see
Appendix E for details), meaning that the effect of the
beamsplitters and phase shifts can be undone by simply
applying the inverse rotation on the classical data.
We assume in the following that the protocol E0 is se-
cure against collective attacks, in the sense that for any
pure state ρABE ∈ HA⊗HB⊗HE whereHE ∼= HA⊗HB,
the quantity
∥∥(E0 −F0)⊗ idK (ρ⊗nABE)∥∥1 can be made ex-
ponentially small in n, say 2−cδ
2n, at the price of reducing
the secret key rate by an arbitrary small fraction δ com-
pared to the asymptotic optimal rate, for some constant
c > 0. We note that despite being proven secure against
collective attacks in the asymptotic limit [10, 11, 18], the
security of E0 for finite size attacks is not yet completely
understood in the sense that the precise values of c and
δ are not currently known: this is due to the difficulty of
estimating a covariance matrix in the finite-size regime
(see [19]).
As we mentioned above, we will prove the security of
a slightly modified protocol, noted E which starts with
n+ k modes (instead of n in the case of E0), k of which
being used to conduct a test T . If the test passes, corre-
sponding roughly to a scenario where the state does not
contain too many photons, then Alice and Bob proceed
with the protocol E0, otherwise they abort. The test T
is in fact only applied to Bob’s classical data. Indeed,
we assume here that Alice prepares her state in a trusted
environment meaning that her reduced state is an (n+k)-
modal thermal state. Note that one could easily remove
this assumption and also apply T to Alice’s state.
The test consists in first choosing a random rotation R
in R2(n+k) (with the appropriate measure) and applying
it to the 2(n + k)-dimensional vector corresponding to
Bob’s measurement outcomes (as well as to Alice’s vec-
tor). Let us denote by q1, p1, q2, p2, · · · , qk, pk the first 2k
coordinates of Bob’s rotated vector and define the vari-
able Yk :=
∑k
i=1(q
2
i +p
2
i ). The coordinates correspond to
heterodyne measurements of k modes of ρn+kB after being
processed through an appropriate network of beamsplit-
ters and phase-shifts (see Appendix E). The test T is
characterized by 2 parameters: a positive number Ytest
and k. The test passes if Yk ≤ Ytest and fails other-
wise. More precisely, because the test commutes with
the measurement, it can equivalently be seen as a map
from (HA ⊗HB)⊗(n+k) to (HA ⊗HB)⊗n (plus an addi-
tional bit encoding whether the test passed or not) that
returns the n remaining modes when it passes and an
“abort” state when it fails.
It is also useful to describe the CP map P charac-
terized by three numbers, n, and the local dimensions
dA and dB. It corresponds to the binary outcome mea-
surement in (HA ⊗ HB)⊗n described by the POVM
{P⊗nA ⊗ P⊗nB ,1 − P⊗nA ⊗ P⊗nB } where PA and PB are
the single-mode projectors on HA and HB, respectively,
defined as PA/B = |0〉〈0|+|1〉〈1|+· · ·+|dA/B−1〉〈dA/B−1|.
In order to establish Theorem 1, we will bound the
probability pbad of the following bad event: "the state
passes the test and the projection onto P⊗nA ⊗P⊗nB fails"
for some initial state ρnAB ∈ (HA ⊗HB)⊗n. Let us note
ρ˜nAB the unnormalized state after the test when it passed;
the probability of passing the test is simply ptest = trρ˜
n
AB
and pbad = tr
[
(1− P) ◦ T (ρn+kAB )]. One can bound pbad
in the following way:
pbad = tr
(
idAB − P⊗nA ⊗ P⊗nB
)
ρ˜nAB
≤ tr [(idA − P⊗nA ) ρ˜nA]+ tr [(idB − P⊗nB ) ρ˜nB]
≤ tr [(idA − P⊗nA ) ρnA]+ tr [(idB − P⊗nB ) ρ˜nB](4)
where we used the union bound and the fact that Al-
ice does apply the test. The first term is easy to com-
pute because the state of Alice, a multimode thermal
state, is well known: ρnA = ρ
⊗n
thermal with ρthermal =
4∑∞
k=0
λk
(1+λ)k+1 |k〉〈k| for a state with λ photons per mode.
The value of λ is a parameter of the protocol and should
be optimized given the expected characteristics of the
quantum channel. The union bound gives
1− tr (P⊗nA ρnA) ≤ n(1− tr (PAρthermal)) = n
(
λ
1 + λ
)dA
.
In particular, choosing dA =
log(n/ǫA)
log(1+1/λ) for the dimension
of Alice’s Hilbert space leads to 1− tr (P⊗nA ρnA) ≤ ǫA.
Bounding the second term in Eq. (4) is much trick-
ier because one cannot assume that Bob’s state ρnB is
Gaussian or that it even has an i.i.d. structure. This
is because it corresponds to the output of the unknown
quantum channel controlled by Eve. Here, we will make
use of the specific symmetries of the QKD protocol in
phase space in order to simplify greatly the problem. In
general, most protocols are invariant under permutations
of the subsystems of Alice and Bob. This means that
the state ρnAB (and therefore also ρ
n
B) can be assumed
to display this invariance. However, CVQKD protocols
such as the one considered here respect a much stronger
symmetry: they are invariant when Alice and Bob ap-
ply to their respective (n + k) modes conjugate passive
linear transformations, implemented by any network of
beamsplitters and phase shifts [18, 20] (see Appendix E
for details). Here, it is crucial that the test T respects
the symmetry, and this can be enforced at the level of
classical data by the choice of the random subspace T of
R
2(n+k) (as explained before).
Thanks to this symmetry, one can assume that the
state ρn+kB of Bob (before applying the test T ) is
rotationally invariant, that is, left invariant under the
action of any network of passive linear operations on
their n + k modes. Such states were already studied in
Ref. [21] where a de Finetti theorem was established: if
sufficiently many modes of ρn+kB are traced out, then the
remaining state is close to a mixture of thermal states.
Intuitively, one then expects that the second term of Eq.
4 behaves like the first one, and this is what we prove rig-
orously. Before we explain how to bound tr
(
P⊗nB ρ˜
n
B
)
, we
recall two useful properties of states, such as ρn+kB , which
are rotationally invariant [21]. First, these states are
mixtures of generalized (n+k)-mode Fock states σn+kp :=
1/
(
n+k+p−1
p
)∑
p1+···+pm=p |p1, p2, · · · , pm〉〈p1, p2, · · · , pm|,
where |p1, · · · , pm〉 is the product of Fock states with
p1 photons in the first mode, p2 photons in the second
mode, etc, and the sum is taken over all states with
a total number of p photons in n + k modes. This
means that there exist λ0 ≥ 0, λ1 ≥ 0, · · · such that
ρn+kB =
∑∞
p=0 λpσ
n+k
p . The second useful property is
that the Wigner function W (q1, p1, · · · , qn+k, pn+k) of
ρn+kB is isotropic, that is only depending on the norm
of the vector (q1, p1, · · · , qn+k, pn+k). The same also
holds for the Q-function of the state, that is the prob-
ability distribution of the outcomes of the heterodyne
measurements.
Let us introduce another random variable Zn :=
1/(2n)
∑n
i=1 q
2
k+i + p
2
k+i, corresponding to the norm of
Bob’s heterodyne measurements for the n modes of ρn+kB
not measured during the test T . We show in the ap-
pendix that the probability ǫtest of passing the test but
Zn being much larger than Ytest is exponentially small
in k when the value of Ytest is chosen slightly larger
the expected variance of Bob’s measurement results (see
Lemma A.2). In turn, this implies that the total num-
ber of photons in the state ρnB is bounded by O(nYtest)
(see Lemma A.3). Finally, we show that the projection
over the space H⊗nB succeeds with high probability if
dB = dimHB = O
(
log 2nǫ
)
(see Lemma A.4). This fi-
nally provides a bound on ||(1 − P) ◦ T ||⋄ and proves
Theorem 1.
We now put things together and establish that pro-
tocol E is secure against general attacks. First, choos-
ing dA and dB on the order of O(log(n/ǫtest)), one ob-
tains ||(1 − P) ◦ T ||⋄ ≤ ǫtest. Second, assuming that
the original protocol E0 is secure against collective at-
tacks, the diamond norm ||E˜ − F˜||⋄ can be bounded
by 2−cδ
2n+O(log2(n/ǫtest)) using the postselection tech-
nique where the dimension of the relevant Hilbert space
HA⊗HB is dAdB = O
(
log2(n/ǫtest)
)
(see [5] for details).
This shows that protocol E is ǫ-secure against general at-
tacks with
ǫ = 2−cδ
2n+O(log2(n/ǫtest)) + 2ǫtest. (5)
Conclusion.—We have proved that Gaussian
continuous-variable QKD protocols, using a Gaussian
distribution of coherent states and homodyne or het-
erodyne measurements, are secure against arbitrary
attacks. Our proof exploits the specific symmetries
in phase-space of Gaussian QKD protocols and uses
a simple test to ensure that the global state shared
between Alice and Bob is well described by assigning
a low dimensional Hilbert space to each mode. This
allows one to use the postselection technique introduced
in Ref. [5] for discrete-variable protocols. Our result
greatly improves on a previous one using a de Finetti
theorem which could not be applied to prove the security
of protocols in realistic experimental implementations.
Finally, our analysis indicates that in order to prove
the security of any QKD protocol, one should exploit
all the available symmetries of the protocol, beyond the
traditional permutation.
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6Appendix
In this appendix, we detail the various technical results used in the main text. In Appendix A, we explicitly
state our main theorem for the continuous-variable protocol where Bob uses heterodyne detection. The proof of the
main theorem uses three lemmas which are established in Appendices B, C and D. In Appendix E, we detail why
the protocol is invariant under the action of a network of beamsplitters and phase shifts, justifying the symmetry
assumption made on Bob’s quantum state.
The rest of the appendix is devoted to protocols where Bob performs a homodyne detection instead of a heterodyne
one. We state our main theorem in that case in Appendix F. We prove in Appendix G that Bob’s state can again
be considered invariant under the action of beamsplitters and phase shifts. Our main theorem uses two of the same
lemmas as in the heterodyne case and a variant of the third one which is established in Appendix H.
Appendix A: Main theorem for the heterodyne protocol
In order to make use of the relevant symmetries in phase space, the test itself should be invariant under the
application of an arbitrary network of beamsplitters and phase-shifts on Bob’s (n+ k) modes before he proceeds with
his measurement. This can be enforced by actively symmetrizing the state, which can be done at the level of classical
data (see Ref. [22] for a discussion on this active symmetrization).
Bob randomly chooses a random unitary U from the Haar measure on the unitary group U(n + k). Then, he
symmetrizes his state thanks to the network of beamsplitters and phase shifts applying the transformation U on the
annihilation (b1, · · · , bn+k) and creation operators (b†1, · · · , b†n+k) of his (n+ k) modes through
bi →
n+k∑
j=1
Ui,jbj and b
†
i →
n+k∑
j=1
U∗i,jb
†
j (A1)
and finally measures his (n + k) modes with a heterodyne detection. The state ρ⊗(k+n) held by Bob after this
symmetrization is called rotationally invariant.
Crucially, Bob can also first measure his state with a heterodyne detection and only then implement U by applying
the symplectic transformation S given by
S :=
(
Re(U) −Im(U)
Im(U) Re(U)
)
(A2)
to his classical vector of measurements. This is true because the symmetrization in phase-space commutes with the
heterodyne measurement (see Appendix E for details).
We denote (q1, p1, · · · , qn+k, pn+k) the classical vector Bob obtains after this procedure. Thanks to the symmetriza-
tion, without loss of generality, the test T can be applied to the first k modes, that is to the data (q1, p1, · · · , qk, pk).
We now state our main theorem for the protocol with heterodyne detection.
Theorem A.1 (Heterodyne protocol). Let ǫ, Ytest > 0 be fixed parameters. Let Yk =
1
k
∑k
i=1(q
2
i + p
2
i ) be the average
of Bob’s (squared) heterodyne measurement outcomes on the first k modes of his state after symmetrization, and let
ρn be the state of the n remaining modes. Let dB :=
log(4n/ǫ)
log(1+1/d0)
where d0 := g
(
ǫ
4
)
Ytest (and g is defined in Eq. A9)
and let HB = Span {|0〉, · · · , |dB − 1〉} be the finite dimensional Hilbert space spanned by states with less than dB
photons. Then the probability that Yk ≤ Ytest and that the projection of ρn onto H⊗nB fails is less than ǫ.
In order to prove Theorem A.1, we need to introduce some operators acting on some subspace of H⊗(n+k)B . To keep
notation simple, we use the subscript k (resp. n) when the operator acts on H⊗kB (resp. H⊗nB ) corresponding to the
first k modes (resp. the last n modes) of the symmetrized state. Let us define the POVM elements Tk, Tn, Un and
Vn on H⊗n as follows:
• Tk acting on H⊗k corresponding to a failed test, meaning that the value of the observable Yk is larger than Ttest:
Tk := 1
πk
∫
∑k
i=1 |αi|2≥Ytest
|α1〉〈α1| · · · |αk〉〈αk|dα1 · · · dαk, (A3)
7• Tn is the projector onto products of coherent states |α1〉 · · · |αn〉 ∈ H⊗nB such that
∑n
i=1 |αi|2 ≥ nd0:
Tn :=
1
πn
∫
∑n
i=1 |αi|2≥nd0
|α1〉〈α1| · · · |αn〉〈αn|dα1 · · · dαn, (A4)
• Un is the projector onto the subspace of H⊗n spanned by states with more than nd0 photons
Un :=
∞∑
m=nd0+1
Πnm, (A5)
where we introduced the projector Πnm on the subspace spanned by n-mode states containing m photons:
Πnm =
∑
m1+···+mn=m
|m1 · · ·mn〉〈m1 · · ·mn|. (A6)
• Vn is the projector onto the subspace of H⊗n such that at least one mode contains at least dB photons:
Vn := 1− P⊗nB , (A7)
where PB := |0〉〈0|+ · · ·+ |dB − 1〉〈dB − 1|.
With these notations, Theorem A.1 simply gives an upper bound on pbad := tr
[
Vn(1− Tk)ρn+k
]
for any rotationally
invariant state ρn+k ∈ H⊗(n+k)B . The quantity pbad is the probability that the state passes the test and that the
projection on the finite-dimensional subspace H⊗nB fails.
The proof of the theorem uses the following variants of three technical lemmas proven in Sections B, C and D of
this appendix. We first state Lemma A.2 which is a corollary of a result proven in Section B.
Lemma A.2. Let X = (X1, · · · , Xk+n) be a vector of Cn+k. Let U be a random unitary transformation of U(n+ k)
drawn from the Haar measure, and define Y = UX. Then
Pr
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
|Yk+i|2 ≥ g(δ) 1
k
k∑
i=1
|Yk|2
]
≤ δ (A8)
where
g(δ) =
1 + 2
√
log(1/δ)
2n +
2 log(2/δ)
2n
1−
√
2
k log
(
2
δ
) . (A9)
By construction, the vector Y = (Y1, · · · , Yn+k) is uniformly distributed on the complex sphere in Cn+k with
radius ||Y ||, and consequently, the real vector (Re(Y1), Im(Y1), · · · ,Re(Yn+k), Im(Y tn+k)) is uniformly distributed on
the corresponding real sphere in R2(n+k). Lemma A.2 is then a special case of Lemma B.1.
The following lemma is proved in Section C.
Lemma A.3.
Un ≤ 2Tn. (A10)
Our final lemma quantifies the maximum number of photons in a single mode for a rotationally invariant state with
nd photons in n modes, except with a small probability:
Lemma A.4. Let m1, · · · ,mn be the random variables corresponding to photon counting measurements of the n
modes of the state σnnd which is a uniform mixture of states with nd photons in n modes. Then, the following bound
holds:
Pr
[
max
i=1···n
mi ≥
log
(
2n
ǫ
)
log(1 + 1/d)
]
≤ ǫ. (A11)
8Proof of Theorem A.1. We fix d0 := g
(
ǫ
4
)
Ytest and dB :=
log(4n/ǫ)
log(1+1/d0)
. From Lemma A.2, we know that
trTn(1k − Tk)ρn+k ≤ ǫ
4
(A12)
for any rotationally invariant state ρn+k. From Lemma A.3, we obtain
trUn(1k − Tk)ρn+k ≤ ǫ
2
(A13)
and Lemma A.4 shows that
tr (1− Un)Vnρn+k ≤ ǫ
2
(A14)
for any rotationally invariant state ρn+k.
Using that Vn ≤ Vn(1− Un) + Un, one finally has:
pbad,Bob := tr
[
(Vn ◦ T )ρn+k
]
(A15)
= tr
[
Vn(1k − Tk)ρn+k
]
(A16)
≤ tr [(1 − Un)Vn(1k − Tk)ρn+k] + [Un(1k − Tk)ρn+k] (A17)
≤ tr [(1 − Un)Vnρn+k]+ 2trTn(1k − Tk)ρn+k (A18)
≤ ǫ
2
+ 2× ǫ
4
(A19)
≤ ǫ. (A20)
Appendix B: Concentration of measure on the sphere
In this section, we establish the following result which implies Lemma A.2.
Lemma B.1. If the vector X = (X1, · · · , Xk+n) is uniformly distributed on the unit sphere of Rn+k, then
Pr
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
X2k+i ≥ g(δ)
1
k
k∑
i=1
X2k
]
≤ δ (B1)
where
g(δ) =
1 + 2
√
log(2/δ)
n +
2 log(2/δ)
n
1− 2
√
1
k log
(
2
δ
) . (B2)
We do not prove Lemma B.1 directly because manipulating normalized vectors on the sphere is not very convenient.
We use instead the natural invariance of the problem and first show that it is sufficient to prove the lemma for
independent normal variables instead of vectors on the unit sphere. This is the case because a uniformly chosen
vector on the sphere can be obtained by drawing n independent normal variables and normalizing the corresponding
vector.
Let X1, · · · , Xn be such independent normal random variables: Xi ∼ N (0, 1), and let us define the following
quantities:
Yk =
1
k
k∑
i=1
X2i and Zn =
1
n
n∑
i=1
X2k+i. (B3)
Note that the normalized random vector X˜ = 1√∑n+k
i=1 X
2
i
(X1, · · · , Xn+k) is uniformly distributed on the unit sphere
of Rn+k. In particular, it is sufficient to prove that
Pr [Zn ≥ g(δ)Yk] ≤ δ (B4)
9in order to establish the lemma.
Let us proceed with the proof of Eq. B4. We first notice that for any A > 0,
Pr [Zn ≥ g(δ)Yk] ≤ Pr [Yk ≤ A] + Pr [Zn ≥ g(δ)A] . (B5)
We can now bound this two probabilities using the fact that Yk and Zn are independent random variables, with
a χ2(k) and a χ2(n) distribution, respectively. To this end, we use two bounds on χ2 distributions established by
Laurent and Massart [23]:
Pr
[
Yk ≤ 1− 2
√
x
k
]
≤ exp(−x) and Pr
[
Zn ≥ 1 + 2
√
x
n
+
2x
n
]
≤ exp(−x). (B6)
Choosing x = log(2/δ) in both cases gives:
Pr
[
Yk ≤ 1− 2
√
log(2/δ)
k
]
≤ δ
2
and Pr
[
Zn ≥ 1 + 2
√
log(2/δ)
n
+
2 log(2/δ)
n
]
≤ δ
2
. (B7)
Taking A := 1− 2
√
1
k log
(
2
ǫ
)
concludes the proof of Lemma B.1.
Appendix C: Proof of Lemma A.3
In this section, we prove Lemma A.3 which we recall here.
Lemma A.3. Let Tn and Un be defined as
Tn :=
1
πn
∫
∑n
i=1 |αi|2≥nd0
|α1〉〈α1| · · · |αn〉〈αn|dα1 · · · dαn, (C1)
and
Un :=
∞∑
m=nd0+1
Πnm with Π
n
m =
∑
m1+···+mn=m
|m1 · · ·mn〉〈m1 · · ·mn|. (C2)
Then, the following inequality holds:
Un ≤ 2Tn. (C3)
1. Some preliminaries
The following integrals will be useful. For a > 0, let us define:
In(a) =
∫
yi≥0,
∑
n
i=1 yi≥a
e−y1−y2···−yndy1 · · ·dyn (C4)
and
Jn(k, a) =
∫
yi≥0,
∑
n
i=1 yi≥a
yk1
k!
e−y1−y2···−yndy1 · · · dyn. (C5)
These integrals can be computed explicitly.
Lemma C.1.
In(a) = e
−a
n−1∑
k=0
ak
k!
(C6)
Jn(k, a) =
Γ(k + 1, a)
Γ(k + 1, 0)
+ e−a
k+n∑
m=k+1
am
m!
. (C7)
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Proof. The first equality is proved by induction. It is clear that I1(a) = e
−a. Then:
1− In+1(a) =
∫
yi≥0,
∑n+1
i=1 yi≤a
e−y1−y2···−yn+1dy1 · · · dyn+1 (C8)
=
∫ a
0
dyn+1e
−yn+1
∫
yi≥0,
∑n
i=1 yi≤d0−yn+1
e−y1−y2···−yndy1 · · ·dyn (C9)
=
∫ a
0
dyn+1e
−yn+1(1− In(a− yn+1)) (C10)
=
∫ a
0
dyn+1e
−yn+1
(
1− e−a+yn+1
n−1∑
k=0
(a− yn+1)k
k!
)
(C11)
= 1− e−a − e−a
∫ a
0
n−1∑
k=0
(a− y)k
k!
dy (C12)
= 1− e−a − e−a
n−1∑
k=0
ak+1
(k + 1)!
(C13)
= 1− e−a
n∑
k=0
ak
k!
(C14)
(C15)
Jn(k, a) = 1−
∫
yi≥0,
∑n
i=1 yi≤a
yk1
k!
e−y1−y2···−yndy1 · · ·dyn (C16)
= 1−
∫ a
0
dy1
yk1
k!
e−y1
∫
yi≥0,
∑
n
i=2 yi≤a−y1
e−y2−y3···−yndy2 · · · dyn (C17)
= 1−
∫ a
0
dy1
yk1
k!
e−y1(1 − In−1(a− y1)) (C18)
= 1−
∫ a
0
dy1
yk1
k!
e−y1
(
1− e−a+y1
n−1∑
m=0
(a− y1)m
m!
)
(C19)
=
Γ(k + 1, a)
Γ(k + 1, 0)
+ e−a
n−1∑
m=0
∫ a
0
yk(a− y)m
k!m!
dy (C20)
where Γ(s, x) =
∫∞
x
ts−1e−tdt is the incomplete gamma function Using the fact that
∫ a
0
xk(a− x)mdx = k!m!a
k+m+1
(k +m+ 1)!
, (C21)
one obtains
Jn(k, a) =
Γ(k + 1, a)
Γ(k + 1, 0)
+ e−a
n−1∑
m=0
(a)k+m+1
(k +m+ 1)!
(C22)
=
Γ(k + 1, a)
Γ(k + 1, 0)
+ e−a
k+n∑
m=k+1
am
m!
(C23)
(C24)
11
2. Proof of Lemma A.3
Integrating over the n phases gives:
Tn =
∑
k1,··· ,kn
∫
xi≥0,
∑n
i=1 xi≥nd0
n∏
i=1
e−xi
xkii
ki!
dxi|k1 · · · kn〉〈k1 · · · kn|. (C25)
Because of its rotation invariance in phase-space, the operator Tn can be written as a mixture of Π
n
k . Let us note
qk ≥ 0 the corresponding coefficients: Tn =
∑∞
k=0 qkΠ
n
k . Considering the term 〈k, 0, · · · , 0|Tn|k, 0, · · · , 0〉, it is easy
to see that qk = Jn(k, nd0).
The proof is then immediate by noticing that the sequence Γ(k+1,a)Γ(k+1,0) = qk − e−a
∑k+n
m=k+1
am
m! (where we used the
result of Lemma C.1) is positive and increasing with k for all a ≥ 0. Here, Γ(s, x) := ∫∞x ts−1e−tdt refers to the
incomplete Gamma function. This means that for k ≥ nd0 + 1,
qk ≥ Γ(nd0 + 1, nd0)
Γ(nd0 + 1, 0)
+ e−a
k+n∑
m=k+1
am
m!
≥ Γ(nd0 + 1, nd0)
Γ(nd0 + 1, 0)
≥ 1
2
, (C26)
where we used that Γ(x+1,x)Γ(x+1,0) is lower bounded by 1/2 for all x ≥ 0. This allows us to conclude that
Un ≤ 2Tn. (C27)
Appendix D: Proof of Lemma A.4
The set of vectors X = (X1, · · · , Xn) such that
∑n
i=1Xi = k and X1 ≥ m contains ank−m :=
(
n+k−m−1
k−m
)
elements.
Let us note pk(m,n) the probability that the maximum of Xi is greater than m if one measures the photon number
for the state σnk :
pk(m,n) = Pr
[
max
i=1···n
Xi ≥ m s.t.
n∑
i=1
Xi = k
]
. (D1)
The union bound gives:
pk(m,n) ≤ Pr
[
X1 ≥ m s.t.
n∑
i=1
Xi = k
]
+ · · ·+ Pr
[
Xn ≥ m s.t.
n∑
i=1
Xi = k
]
(D2)
≤ na
n
k−m
ank
= n
(n+ k −m− 1)!k!
(n+ k − 1)!(k −m)! =
n(n+ k)
n+ k −m
(n+ k −m)!k!
(n+ k)!(k −m)! . (D3)
Let x > 0, then Stirling approximation formula reads (here log is the natural logarithm):
nx logn+nx(log x−1)+ 1
2
logn+
1
2
log x+log
√
2π ≤ log(nx)! ≤ nx logn+nx(log x−1)+ 1
2
logn+
1
2
log x+1. (D4)
Let us introduce the variables d and δ such that k = dn and m = δn. Then
log
(n+ k −m)!k!
(n+ k)!(k −m)! = log(n(d+ 1− δ))! + log(nd)!− log(n(d+ 1))!− log(n(d− δ))! (D5)
≤ −n {g(d)− g(d− δ)}+ 1
2
log
d(d+ 1− δ)
(d+ 1)(d− δ) + 2− log 2π (D6)
where
g(x) = (x+ 1) log(x+ 1)− x log x. (D7)
This gives
log pk(m,n) ≤ −n {g(d)− g(d− δ)} + logn+ 1
2
log
d(d+ 1)
(d− δ)(d − δ + 1) + 2− log 2π (D8)
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The function g is concave which implies that g(d)− g(d− δ) ≥ δg′(d) = δ log(1 + 1/d), and therefore
− log pk(m,n) ≥ nδ log(1 + 1/d)− logn+ 1
2
log
(d+ 1)(d+ 1− δ)
d(d− δ) − 2 + log 2π (D9)
≥ nδ log(1 + 1/d)− logn− 2 + log 2π (D10)
≥ nδ log(1 + 1/d)− logn− log 2 (D11)
(D12)
Choosing m = log(2n/ǫ)log(1+1/d) gives pk(m,n) ≤ ǫ and proves Lemma A.4.
Appendix E: Symmetry of the state for heterodyne detection
In this section, we show that the symplectic transformation applied in phase-space commutes with the heterodyne
detection. The compact subgroup of the symplectic group Sp(2N,R) consisting of phase shifts and beamsplitters is
usually noted K(n) in the literature and is isomorphic to the unitary group U(N) (see for instance Ref. [24]). We note
~a := (aˆ1, · · · , aˆN ) and ~a† := (aˆ†1, · · · , aˆ†N ) the vectors of annihilation and creation operators of the N modes considered.
Then, in the Heisenberg picture, under a symplectic transformation, the aˆ’s and aˆ†’s transform independently as:
~a→ U~a, and ~a† → U∗~a†, (E1)
where U is a unitary matrix.
Moreover, defining V = Re(U) and W = −Im(U) the real and imaginary parts of U such that U = V − iW , the
displacement vector (~x, ~p)T := (x1, · · · , xN , p1, · · · , pN )T is transformed as(
~x
~p
)
→
(
V W
−W V
)(
~x
~p
)
. (E2)
In the quantum key distribution protocol, both Alice and Bob perform a heterodyne measurement of their respective
n + k modes. The probability distribution of their outcomes is given by the Q-function of the state ρn+kAB ∈ (HA ⊗
HB)⊗(n+k): Qρ(~xA, ~pA, ~xB, ~pB). From the description given above of the subgroup K(n), it appears that the Q-
function associated with the "rotated" state ρ′ := (UA ⊗ U∗B)ρn+kAB (UA ⊗ U∗B)† (where U is the representation of the
symplectic transformation corresponding to the unitary U) is simply:
Qρ′(~x
′
A, ~p
′
A, ~x
′
B, ~p
′
B) = Qρ(V ~xA −W~pA,W~xA + V ~pA, V ~xB +W~pB,−W~xB + ~V pB). (E3)
This local (and classical) transformation of the coordinates can be applied by Alice and Bob. In other words,
the quantum transformation corresponding to the networks of beamsplitters and phase-shifts commutes with the
heterodyne measurement.
Moreover, if one makes sure that the test (i.e., the choice of the random 2k-dimensional subspace of R2(n+k))
respects the symmetry above, then the post processing of the QKD protocol commutes with the map UA ⊗ U∗B,
meaning that the state ρn+kAB can be considered invariant under such maps. In particular, the state held by Bob,
ρn+kB := trAρ
n+k
AB is invariant under any U consisting in beamsplitters and phase shifts.
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Appendix F: Main theorem for the homodyne protocol
We now consider a protocol where Alice sends coherent states with a Gaussian modulation and Bob performs
homodyne detection with a random quadrature chosen uniformly in [0, 2π] for each of his n+ k modes.
In the following, we note X1, · · · , Xn+k the random variables corresponding to the n+ k quadrature measurement
outcomes for Bob. We assume that for each mode, Bob chooses a random direction θ ∈ [0, π/2] in phase space. Then,
he chooses to measure the quadrature either along θ (which we call a q measurement) or along θ + π/2 (this is the p
measurement). We will show in Section G that Bob’s state can be assumed to rotationally invariant.
Our main result is summarized by the following theorem.
Theorem F.1. Let ǫ, Ytest > 0 be fixed parameters. Let Yk =
1
k
∑k
i=1X
2
i be the average of Bob’s (squared) homodyne
measurement outcomes on the first k modes of his symmetrized state, and let ρn be the state of his n remaining modes.
Let d0 := 2g
(
ǫ
16
)
Yk. We choose n large enough so that e
−βn ≤ ǫ16 with β := c0d0 − log d02 and c0 := (1− 1/
√
2)2. Let
dB =
log(4n/ǫ)
log(1+1/d0)
. Let HB = Span {|0〉, · · · , |dB − 1〉} be the finite dimensional Hilbert space spanned by states with
less than dB photons. Then the probability that Yk ≤ Ytest and that the projection of ρn onto H⊗nB fails is less than ǫ.
The main novelty compared to the heterodyne protocol is the introduction of the operator Wn, corresponding to
the projection on the event [Zn ≥ d0/2], where Zn = 1n
∑k
i=1X
2
k+i. Let us define the random variable si ∈ {qi, pi}
corresponding to a quadrature measurement for the mode i, either q or p. Then, we can define a string s ∈ {q, p}n as
being the n quadrature measurement outcomes when measuring the state ρn. With these notations,
Wn =
1
2n
∑
s∈{x,p}n
PZn(s)≥d0/2. (F1)
We prove the following result in Section H.
Lemma F.2.
Tn ≤ 2Wn + e−βn1n (F2)
where β = c0d0 − log d02 and c0 = (1 − 1/
√
2)2.
The proof of Theorem F.1 then follows exactly the same lines at that of Theorem A.1.
Appendix G: Symmetry of Bob’s state for the protocol with homodyne detection
Let ρn+k =
∑
~i,~j a~i,~j |i1, i2, · · · , in+k〉〈j1, j2, · · · , jn+k| be Bob n+ k-mode state.
The measurement protocol is the following:
• for each mode j, Bob draws θj uniformly in [0, 2π] and measures the quadrature along cos θjqj + sin θjpj . He
obtains a measurement outcome xj . It is actually sufficient to pick θ from the set {0, 2π 1dB , 2π 2dB , · · · , 2π dB−1dB }.
• Bob then randomly chooses an orthogonal transformation R in Rn+k and applies it to his vector ~x =
(x1, · · · , xn+k).
• finally, Bob informs Alice of his choices of θj and R.
Crucially, the transformation R can be equivalently obtained by applying a network of beamsplitters on the n + k
modes.
Because of the random choice of the measured quadratures, the state ρn+k can be considered invariant under the
application of U(θj) = e
iθja
†
jaj . This means that
ρn+k ∝
∫
~θ∈[0,2π]n

 n∏
j=1
U(θj)

 ρ

 n∏
j=1
U(−θj)

 d~θ (G1)
∝
∑
~i,~j
a~i,~j |i1, i2, · · · , in+k〉〈j1, j2, · · · , jn+k|
∫
~θ∈[0,2π]n+k
eiθ1(i1−j1) · · · eiθ1(in+k−jn+k)d~θ (G2)
∝
∑
~i
a~i,~i|i1, i2, · · · , in+k〉〈i1, i2, · · · , in+k|. (G3)
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Because of the random rotation of the measurement results, the state can also be considered invariant under
the action of any network of beamsplitters. In particular, it should be invariant when swapping any two modes
and when applying infinitesimal beamsplitters. The first condition shows that the coefficient a~i := a~i,~i is invariant
when permuting the coordinates of the vector ~i. The invariance under infinitesimal beamsplitters guarantees that
ai1,i2,i3,··· ,in+k = ai1+1,i2−1,i3,··· ,in+k = ai1+···+in+k,0,··· ,0. In particular, the coefficient a~i only depends on the total
number of photons i in the n modes.
Finally, the state ρn+k can be assumed to be a mixture of the states σn+ki defined as:
σn+ki =
1(
n+k+i−1
i
) ∑
∑
ij
=i
|i1, · · · , in+k〉〈i1, · · · , in+k|. (G4)
Appendix H: Proof of Lemma F.2
1. Preliminaries
Let us define F (~a) as
F (~a) =
1
πn/2
∫
‖~z‖2≥nd0
d~ze−‖~z−~a‖
2
. (H1)
The spherical symmetry of the function guarantees that F (~a) only depends on the norm of ~a. Let us note a = ‖~a‖. In
the following, it is sometimes useful to think of the vector ~a as ~a = (a, 0, · · · , 0). The following bound will be useful
in the proof of Lemma F.2.
Lemma H.1. For any d0 > 0,
F
(√
nd0
2
)
≤ e−βn, with β =
(
1− 1√
2
)2
d0 − log d0
2
. (H2)
Proof. Let us first compute the following n-dimensional integral (we use spherical coordinates and recall that the
surface of the unit sphere in Rn is 2π
n/2
Γ(n/2) ):
1
πn/2
∫
∑n
i=1 z
2
i≥b2
exp
(
−
n∑
i=1
z2i
)
dz1 · · · dzn = 1
Γ(n/2)
∫ ∞
R=b2
Rn/2−1e−RdR
=
Γ
(
n
2 , b
2
)
Γ
(
n
2 , 0
) . (H3)
Then, translating the variable ~z by ~a, one obtains for a ≤ √nd0,
F (a) ≤ 1
πn/2
∫
‖~z‖2≥(√nd0−a)2
d~ze−‖~z‖
2
(H4)
≤ Γ
(
n
2 , (
√
nd0 − a)2
)
Γ
(
n
2 , 0
) , (H5)
where the first inequality holds because the integration domain contains the one of the definition of F (a), and the
second is the application of Eq. H3 with b =
√
nd0 − 1. Choosing a =
√
nd0
2 finally gives
F
(√
nd0
2
)
≤ Γ
(
n
2 , nd0c0
)
Γ
(
n
2 , 0
) , (H6)
with
c0 =
(
1− 1√
2
)2
. (H7)
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Let X be a random variable with a Poisson distribution of parameter λ = nc0d0 and assume n to be even, then
Pr [X ≤ n/2] = Γ
(
n
2 , nd0c0
)
Γ
(
n
2 , 0
) , (H8)
which implies that
F
(√
nd0
2
)
≤ Pr [X ≤ n/2] . (H9)
Chernoff bound applied to a Poisson distribution of parameter λ gives:
Pr[X ≤ (1 − δ)λ] ≤
(
e−δ
(1 − δ)1−δ
)λ
, (H10)
which gives here
F
(√
nd0
2
)
≤ e−β˜n, (H11)
with
β˜ = c0d0 − 1 + log(2c0d0)
2
. (H12)
Using the fact that 1 + log(2c0) ≤ 0, one obtains
F
(√
nd0
2
)
≤ e−βn, (H13)
with
β = c0d0 − log d0
2
. (H14)
2. Proof of the lemma
One can use the same trick as in [6] and extend the Hilbert space
⊗n
i=1Hi to
⊗n
i=1Hi⊗H′i and write the operator
Tn as
Tn =
∫
∑
n
i=1 x
2
i+y
2
i≥nd0
H′〈0|U⊗n (|~x〉〈~x|S ⊗ |~y〉〈~y|S¯)U †⊗n|0〉H′d~xd~y (H15)
where the subscripts S and S¯ refer to the two possible choices of quadrature (either described by s or its complement
s¯), U = e± π4 (a⊗ a′† − a† ⊗ a′) is the beamsplitter operator and |0〉H′ is the vacuum state on the space
⊗n
i=1H′i.
The ± sign depends on the specific choice of s. A possible choice for S and S¯ would be S = Q = (Q1, · · · , Qn) and
S¯ = P = (P1, · · · , Pn). In this section, the blod font is used to describe vectors. We also denote |α = x + iy〉 the
coherent state centered in (x, y) in phase space, and will use the equality 〈0|U |x〉S |y〉S¯ = 1√π |α〉.
Let R be the subset of R2n corresponding to the support of the integral above:
R =
{
(~x, ~y) ∈ R2n :
n∑
i=1
x2i + y
2
i ≥ nd0
}
. (H16)
For a string s ∈ {x, y}n, we define the set Rs as
Rs =
{
(~x, ~y) ∈ R2n :
n∑
i=1
s2i ≥ n
d0
2
}
. (H17)
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Note in particular that the coordinates corresponding to S¯ are unbounded in this set. We also introduce the operator
S = S1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Sn where Si = Qi(Pi) if si = xi(yi). Noting s¯ the complement of s, one has for all s:
R ⊂ Rs ∪Rs¯ (H18)
which means that
Tn ≤ As +As¯ (H19)
where
As =
∫
(~x,~y)∈Rs
H′〈0|U⊗n (|~x〉〈~x|S ⊗ |~y〉〈~y|S)U †⊗n|0〉H′d~xd~y. (H20)
Here, we used the fact that the integral of |~y〉〈~y|S on Rn is equal to that of |~y〉〈~y|s¯: this is simply the n-mode
generalization of the well-known identity
∫ |q〉〈q|dq = ∫ |p〉〈p|dp where |q〉 and |p〉 are eigenstates of the quadrature
operators, Q and P , respectively. Since the previous relation holds for any string s, one has:
Tn ≤ 1
2n
∑
s∈{x,y}n
As +As¯ (H21)
Let us compute the value of the operator As:
As =
∫
(~x,~y)∈Rs
H′〈0|
(∣∣∣∣~x+ ~y√2
〉〈
~x+ ~y√
2
∣∣∣∣
S
⊗
∣∣∣∣~x− ~y√2
〉〈
~x− ~y√
2
∣∣∣∣
S
)
|0〉H′d~xd~y (H22)
=
1
πn/2
∫
(~x,~y)∈Rs
e−‖~x−~y‖
2/2
∣∣∣∣~x+ ~y√2
〉〈
~x+ ~y√
2
∣∣∣∣
S
d~xd~y. (H23)
Changing variables: ~z1 =
√
2~x, ~z2 = (~x+ ~y)/
√
2 (that is, ~x = ~z1/
√
2, ~y = −~z1/
√
2 +
√
2~z2) gives
As =
1
πn/2
∫
(~z1,~z2)s.t. (~x,~y)∈Rs
e−‖~z1−~z2‖
2 |~z2〉〈~z2|S d~z1d~z2 (H24)
=
1
πn/2
∫
(~z1,~z2)s.t. (~x,~y)∈Rs
e−‖~z1−S‖
2 |~z2〉〈~z2|S d~z1d~z2 (H25)
=
1
πn/2
∫
‖~z1‖2≥nd0
e−‖~z1−S‖
2
d~z1
∫
~z2∈Rn
|~z2〉〈~z2|S d~z2 (H26)
=
1
πn/2
∫
‖~z1‖2≥nd0
e−‖~z1−S‖
2
d~z1 (H27)
= F (S). (H28)
We now show for all a > 0, F (S) ≤ P ||S||2≥a2 + F (a)1. To prove it, we need to establish that for any eigenvector |~s〉
of the operator S, it holds that
〈~s|F (S)|~s〉 ≤ 〈~s|P ||S||2≥a2 |~s〉+ 〈~s|F (a)1|~s〉. (H29)
There are two possibilities,
• either ||~s||2 ≥ a2, in which case Eq. H29 reads F (||~s||) ≤ 1 + F (a), which clearly holds,
• or ||~s||2 ≤ a2, in which case Eq. H29 reads F (||~s||) ≤ F (a), which holds because F (x) is an increasing function
for x ≥ 0.
Finally, one obtains
Tn ≤ 2
2n
∑
s∈{x,y}n
PZn(s)≥a
2/n + 2F (a)1. (H30)
Choosing a =
√
nd0/2 gives
Tn ≤ 2Wn + 2F
(√
nd0
2
)
1 ≤ 2(Wn + e−βn1), (H31)
which concludes the proof of Lemma F.2.
